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ABSTRACT

The Falkland-Malvinas conflict is a classic example of how a government can manage news in wartime. The rules of the game as evinced by the British government and Ministry of Defense were simple and effective. They controlled access to the fighting, controlled all communications facilities, excluded all neutral correspondents and carefully screened their own, banned or delayed pictorial coverage and live TV, and censored and checked all the material that reporters gathered. In addition, they delayed or suppressed "dangerous news," released bad news in small portions to reduce its impact, played favoritism in rewarding patriotic reporters, and used "technical reasons" as an excuse in many circumstances. By following these procedures, the government gave the impression that the press was allowed to do its job, and at the same time controlled effectively the flow of information. Journalists were allowed to accompany the task force and to file regularly to their news organizations. At the same time, they were wrapped in a net of subtle restrictions that let them work only to the extent desired by the Ministry of Defense. (CRH)

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WAR COVERAGE: THE CASE OF THE FALKLANDS

*By EDOURADO BELLANDO

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CENTER REPORT NO. 494

SUMMARY: The 1982 war between the United Kingdom and Argentina over Falklands-Malvinas prompted a sharp confrontation between the press and the government in Britain. In the following report, the author examines nature of the disagreement.

At 4:30 a.m. on April 2, 1982, Argentinian helicopters landed at Mullett Creek, two miles southeast of Port Stanley. The 120 commandos of the group, Buzo Tactico, made their way toward Port Stanley, the capital of the Falklands-Malvinas. Some men headed east, to reconnoitre Government House, the governor's residence. The larger group turned west, for the British barracks at Moody Brook. At 6:08 a.m. the commandos attacked.[1]

The Falklands-Malvinas war prompted a sharp confrontation between the British government and the press. This confrontation took place in the world's oldest parliamentary democracy. It involved a democratic government and a press claiming a long tradition of autonomy. It bluntly opposed the government's need to disseminate as little information as possible with the newspeople's duty to disseminate as much information as possible. These elements — and many others — make the behavior of the British government and of the British media in the Falklands-Malvinas war worthy of analysis.

THE NEWSMEN AND THE TASK FORCE

If the Royal Navy had its way, no reporter would have accompanied the task force. No provision, initially, was made for journalists. The press strongly reacted, putting pressure on the civil service elements in the Ministry of Defence. The press secretary of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher personally interceded in favor of the journalists.

At first only 10 newsmen were selected to join the task force. Finally 28 newsmen were admitted — 17 correspondents and 11 photographers and technicians. All of them were British: no impartial reporter would witness the conflict.

Donald McCullin, described as "a brilliant and compassionate war photographer with 16 years of experience all over the world" was repeatedly turned down by the Ministry of Defence when he applied to join the press corps. The excuse was that there was insufficient accommodation on board any of the ships. But, as McCullin pointed out, the Ministry of Defence managed to accommodate three million candy bars. He believed the real reason was that his type of war photography threatened the image of the war which the military wanted to convey.[2]

A formidable weapon in the hand of the Ministry of Defence was that only through it could the press gain access to the war. As Knightley points out, the nature of the campaign — a seaborne task force sailing to invade a group of islands 8,000 miles from Britain and 400 miles from the nearest land mass — meant that corrrespondents could not get to the war unless the Ministry of Defence took them.[3]

In addition, the Ministry controlled all the means of communication. The only way the reporters could send their stories was through the military communications facilities.

In return for access to the action, the correspondents had to accept the Ministry of Defence ground rules. These rules were first issued in 1958,[4] and vague from the outset. In essence they were that any military detail that could damage the task force or aid the Argentinians would be excised. Details of the ships' positions, military equipment or plans, the state of the weather were all forbidden. The newsmen were assured, however, that the tone of articles would not be interfered with, as long as the facts supporting it were deemed accurate.[5]

The newsmen "had to sign forms agreeing to accept censorship at the source by the Ministry of Defence public relations officers." There were seven of these officers sailing with the task force. They were inexperienced former journalists; none of them had worked as a reporter. Their peace-time function was to arrange "facility trips" for defence correspondents, and to field journalists' enquiries to the Ministry's press office.[6] The philosophy of these P.R. officers was expressed by their motto, "They shalt not know," which they jokingly proclaimed in front of the journalists.[7] In addition, a military press officer was attached to each unit.

"Vetting" — the term "censorship" was always avoided — was carried out at both ends of the communication chain. All

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stories were first censored by the P.R. officers aboard the task force, before being transmitted to the Ministry of Defence in London. At the Ministry of Defence, the copy was examined again by one of the clearance staff. According to an **IPI Report** there were only three officers, working on a shift system, doing this job. Frequently the two sets of censors were at odds. Finally the copy was distributed on a pool basis to the British media.

The **Times** felt the need to explain this complicated system to its readers on the issue of May 11:

"In exchange for accreditation to the task force news organizations agreed with the Ministry of Defence that dispatches filed by "war" correspondents would be subject to excision of detail considered sensitive for operational reasons. This is carried out prior to transmission by an MoD (Ministry of Defence) press officer with the fleet.

"In addition, transmission is frequently heavily delayed pending release of official information in London — a practice now being reviewed at MoD. Upon receipt at MoD, the copy is again read by officials and occasionally further excision of figures and names has been suggested.

The **Times**, like other British newspapers, has occasionally been requested by government officials not to publish certain items for reasons of operational security, but the reason to comply rests entirely with The **Times**."[8]

Radio and television tapes were received at the BBC World Service's base in London. Members of the broadcasting pool then listened to them as they arrived, together with a Ministry of Defence official.[9]

The BBC and the ITN — Independent News Television — decided to pool their technical effort and their picture coverage. Later, all the media were to pool all available information. Dispatches coming back from ITN and BBC correspondents in voice became available to all newspapers, and all the newspaper material was available to the broadcasters.[10]

BRIEFING IN LONDON

The other major source of information was the Ministry of Defence in London. Here the top official in charge of information was Sir Frank Cooper, permanent under secretary of the Ministry of Defence.

Cooper decided early on to take the job of press relations out of the hands of the Ministry's regular public relations department, and give it to his own civil servants to handle. Thus the men who were on familiar terms with reporters and were used to the pressmen's demands were denied their normal role and deprived of access to information.[11]

All "off the record" briefings ceased. "Instead, a series of briefings by civil servants was instituted. These ranged from what became known as the concourse — the daily press conference chaired by Ian McDonald, the Ministry's official spokesman — to private briefings for defence correspondents;" and to even more private meetings, chaired by Cooper, for the national editors.[12]

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BBC

The first target of the government's criticism was the BBC. The BBC had tried to be impartial in its coverage of the conflict. This attitude prompted sharp reactions from the government.

On May 3, John Page, a Conservative Member of Parliament, criticized the BBC's coverage. "I am worried," he said in the Commons, "that BBC television newsreaders are giving equal credence to the Ministry of Defence reports and the Argentine reports. On **Newsnight**, on Sunday night, Mr. Peter Snow (the BBC anchorman) has used the expression, 'if we believe the British' and 'the only damage the British admitted'." Page added that the presentation of news, on the same broadcast, had been "almost treasonable."[13]

On May 6, Margaret Thatcher joined the battle of words. She complained in the Commons that she had heard from people who watched and listened to news that the Argentine and British forces were "almost being treated as equals." She said that "many people" were concerned that the case for British troops was not put over fully and effectively.[14]

At question time, Page asked Thatcher if Britain's case was being presented on radio and TV in a way likely to give confidence to Britiain's friends abroad and to encourage servicemen.

Thatcher replied:

" Judging from the many comments I have heard from people who watch and listen more than I do, many people are very, very concerned that the case for our British forces is not being put over fully and effectively. I understand there are times when it would seem we and the Argentines are almost being treated as equal and on equal basis.[15]

"If that is the case, it gives offense and causes great emotion among many people."[16]

On the same day, in Whitehall, John Nott (the Secretary of State for Defence) and senior officers complained over what they saw as "the surfeit of armchair strategists" in broadcast abnd press coverage. They suggested that editors should be more patriotic.[17]

These attacks prompted immediate replies from the media, thus bringing in the open the contrasts between the press and the government. The following day, two BBC top officials, Director-General Sir Ian Frethowan and Chairman George Howard, vigorously defended the BBC's coverage. "It was determined that in war the truth should not be the first casualty," Howard said.[18]

On May 10, the **Times** published a long article by Simon Jenkins, sharply critical of the way the government had dealt with the press. In a detailed expose, Jenkins accused the Ministry of Defence of "astonishing gaffes," "tough censorship" and "inexplicable refusals."[19]

On the same day in which Jenkins' article appeared, Francis Pym, the Foreign Secretary, accused the BBC of unfair coverage, said that the government was very concerned at the way it had reported the crisis, and called on people to complain to the corporation.[20]

Also on the same day, Conservative Members of Parliament wrote and circulated a petition entitled "Anti-British Broadcasting by the BBC." The motion expressed dismay that some BBC programs gave the impression of being pro-Argentine, while others appeared to suggest that the Argentinian invasion was a matter in which the BBC was "entitled to remain loftily neutral."[21]

The debate became political on May 11, when leaders of the Labor Party defended the BBC's coverage. The Prime Minister

replied that when lives might be at stake, the media should take into account that some discussion could be of use to the enemy.[22]

On May 13, journalists at both the BBC and ITN deplored "grossly improper government pressure" on TV news. In a joint statement, the TV journalists said that neither organization should be a government information service or a propaganda machine. "We reject any attempt to intimidate the two television news organizations and support effort to maintain our independence," the journalists said.[23]

An independent survey showed that most people believed that the BBC had acted responsibly in its coverage of the war. The survey showed that 81 percent of viewers and listeners questioned supported the BBC, and also felt that the BBC should continue its traditional policy of reflecting the full range of opinion.[24]

NEWSMEN WITH THE TASK FORCE

The newsmen with the task force, totally dependent on the military's good will, had little control over their stories. They saw some of their stories delayed, altered or altogether suppressed.

Due to the various layers of censorship, material could be delayed at each point of the chain. The result was a confusing impression of the sequence of events without anyone actually telling a lie. So nervous were some of the on-board censors that at one point they told journalists not to file until they had heard confirmation of a story from the BBC World Service.[25]

The reporters were led to believe that Argentine troops were starving and suffering from dysentery, although it was later discovered that they were as well provided as the British. Reports were censored — including reference to their being censored.[26]

An account by Eddy et al notes that John Shirley of the **Sunday Times** filed a story which included the sentence "Only the weather holds us back from Stanley." This clause was altered without his knowledge to "only the politicians hold us back from Stanley." John Witherow of the **Times** wrote of "the failure of the Vulcan (warplanes) raids, and found later that this had been transmitted as the success of the raids."[27]

A number of stories also disappeared. The reporter from the Press Association (the British news agency) found on his return that half a dozen dispatches had not reached his London office.[28]

"In the tense hours (before the landing) at San Carlos, the needs of the journalists were at the bottom of everyone's list of priorities. Some found themselves on ships heading away from the action rather towards it. Others were on the scene but miles away from the nearest communications point. Still more wrote stories, gave them to press officers for transmission, then discovered — sometimes days later — that their stories were jammed into someone's pocket, quite forgotten. A helicopter delivery system set up to carry reporters' copy in brown envelopes marked Press broke down because the pilots, flying 15 hours a day, did not have time to worry about deadlines."[29]

After the landing at San Carlos, reporters Witherow (**Times**), McIlroy (**Daily Telegraph**), Parry (**Guardian**), Snow (**Sun**) and Seamark (**Star**) were initially put ashore at Port San Carlos. Then they were removed to a ship remote from the action—over their bitter protests. They were told they did not have the right "kit" or "training," although at exactly the same time Michael Nicholson (ITN) and Brian Hanrahan (BBC TV News), who had neither kit nor training, were allowed to stay and to continue their dispatches.[30]

After the landing, the journalists found themselves virtually isolated from their news organizations. As Fred Emery put it in the **Times**, "since the Ministry has failed to provide any effective means by which correspondents can receive messages sent to them in the field, these are merely stockpiled for weeks out of reach on the (battleship) Canberra. The journalists no longer have any way whatever of receiving guidance or instructions.[31]

Newsmen could not report a battle between two sections of Royal Marine commandos. One British patrol brought mortar fire down on another, believing it to be the enemy, and injured at least four men.[32]

On another occasion," a report of a disastrous night encounter between two British units who had opened fire at each other by mistake became a victorious fire-fight with the enemy."[33]

The bitterness of the newsmen toward the P.R. officers was such that, when finally the British reached Port Stanley, the two groups even refused to have a drink together.[34]

THE CASE OF MAX HASTINGS

Only one of the reporters with the task force did not seem to have any problem. He was Max Hastings, writing for the **Daily Express**, the London **Standard** and the **Spectator** magazine. He had the gift of filing copy congenial to the army — often flattering accounts of British exploits.

Hastings expressed his opinion about the journalist's tasks in a story headlined "None of Us Can Be Neutral in This War." "Most of us decided before landing that our role was simply to report as sympathetically as possible what the British forces are doing today," Hastings wrote. In justification he quoted his father, a noted correspondent in World War II: "When one's nation is at war, reporting becomes an extension of the war effort."[35]

On another occasion Hastings wrote that "like the humblest marine, like most of my colleagues, I am impelled through the day by a brutish determination to see the Argentines driven from the Falklands."[36]

The military rewarded Hastings accordingly. He was free to send dispatches several times daily, without constraint on length or on the number of publications to which he filed.[37] "Interviews with senior officers, denied to others, were laid on for Hastings."[38] He was the first journalist to walk into Port Stanley, and was able to get his report away before anyone else because the Brigadier laid on a helicopter to whisk him back to a ship.[39]

THE LACK OF PICTURES

The conflict was soon defined as "the most unphotographed war since the Crimea." During the first seven weeks, newspapers and television had to endure a near-starvation diet.

The Ministry of Defence explained that this was due to the lack of facilities for satellite hookups aboard the ships.[40]

Analogous "technical problems" existed for television broadcasting. Live TV transmission was deemed impossible. The Ministry said that "operational" communications came first. Anything that might interrupt vital messages had to be delayed or abandoned. There would be "voice overs" but no pictures, and TV reporters had to learn to be radio men instead. "The only way of getting television and even still pic-

tures back was by ship."[41] Films of events in the South Atlantic reached London after weeks. "Here we are in the electronics age," lamented a BBC executive, "and our film gets back to us at 20 miles an hour."[42]

No photographs were available when the British suffered setbacks. "Still photographs of burning British warships, transmitted more quickly to London, were blocked from publication by military censors for days and sometimes weeks."[43]

The technical problems were solved when the British captured Port Stanley. Suddenly there was a flood of pictures showing happy children welcoming the Royal Marines, the Union Jack raised over the islands, troops drinking tea with the Falklanders and so on. These pictures were taken by the Ministry's photographers.[44] As the Ministry explained, "We've got transmission facilities in place now."[45]

Knightley notes that "the war was nearly over," when Britons saw on TV "dramatic scenes of the destruction of some of their warships or heard emotional interviews with survivors." The broadcast of a dramatic TV film of the Argentinian attack on a landing craft, with close-ups of wounded British soldiers, a as delayed until the war was over.[46]

BRIEFING AT THE MINISTRY

In London, the daily briefing at the Ministry of Defence was held by the official spokesman, Ian McDonald. He became the most public expression of the Ministry's information policy. He was immediately nicknamed "the speak-your weight machine;" his slow and deliberate voice was as familiar on radio and TV as the weatherman's. Because he was on the TV news virtually every night, he rapidly became a national figure. His personality became immediately associated with announcements of victories — or defeats.[47]

Eddy and others say McDonald set himself "two apparently irreconciliable ground rules: never knowingly to lie, and never knowingly to endanger the safety of the task force. He was confident that throughout the crisis he never broke either rule. But there were some close calls."[48]

On one occasion, the Ministry had decided not to release the news that two helicopters, carrying SAS troops, had crashed on South Georgia while the island was still in the hands of the Argentinians. Most people were aware that a landing was imminent, and McDonald was asked whether the Task Force had landed or not. He paused momentarily, then said, no, they had not. Strictly speaking, he would argue later, this was the truth. The SAS, being special troops, were not part of the main task force, only attached to it. Anyway, they had crashed, not landed.[49]

"But McDonald's most formidable weapon was silence. Whatever the rumours emerging from Buenos Aires... he would refuse to confirm or deny anything until he was completely certain of it. At one point this led to an extraordinary state of affairs where Argentina was admitting to the loss of two of her airplanes, while McDonald in London would only confirm that one had been shot down' (by the British)."[50]

On other occasions, the Ministry of Defence, while not lying directly, "certainly misled journalists with the calculated intention of deceiving the enemy," according to Eddy and others. The Ministry left uncorrected a number of reports, based on leaks from inside the "government, that made it appear the Royal Navy had significantly more ships, submarines and aircraft around the Falklands than it actually did at various times."[51] The submarine, Superb, widely reported to be in the South Atlantic, was later found in a port in Scotland. "We never said the Superb was in the South Atlantic," a Ministry official said. But the story had never been denied.[52]

By contrast, "good news was released prematurely. The British recapture of Port Darwin and Goose Green were announced a half-day before the Argentinians actually surrendered."

Meanwhile, bad news such as accidental crashes of British warplanes and helicopters to the number of casualties inflicted by Argentine air strikes, often was held up for days.[53] Britain's worst single loss of the conflict — the June 8 Argentine air attack at Fitzroy estuary—was announced five days later.[54] Fifty British soldiers died, but at first reporters were told that the casualties were "minimal."[55] Defence Secretary Nott, sharply criticized for the five-day delay, said that the news was delayed to confuse the Argentine commander in besieged Port Stanley.[56]

The most blatant deception concerned the landing at San Carlos Bay on May 20 — the biggest British operation since Suez in 1956. Hours before the landing of 5,000 British troops, Cooper said in a restricted background briefing that there would be only a series of "hit-and-run" raids, and that there were "no plans" for a "D-Day type invasion." This was not really a lie, Cooper said later, because the Allies' World War II invasion on D-Day was "an opposed landing," while few Argentine defenders were encountered when the British landed at San Carlos.[57]

As late as May 21, Foreign Secretary Pym was still talking about raids.[58]

THE GOVERNMENT'S INFORMATION PHILOSOPHY

Various British officials issued statements that help to explain the government's views of information policy in wartime.

In his observation, Cooper said:

"Obviously the public has got a right to know. But I do not think it has got an unlimited right to know. You have got to give a very high priority to the security of our force and the success of our operation."[59]

When, in July 1982, a House of Commons Defence Committee held a series of hearings to examine the way information had been handled, Cooper said:

"We aimed throughout not to lie, but there were occasions where we did not tell the whole truth and did not correct things that were being misread."[60]

During the same hearings, BBC correspondent Hanrahan said that Admiral John Woodward — the task force commander — had told the reporter it was his intention "to cause as much confusion to the enemy as possible," and if there was any way he could use reporters as part of that attempt, he intended to do so.[61]

Defence Ministry spokesman McDonald exposed his views when he said to reporters:

"I will never tell you anything that I know to be false. However, when the lives of the men of the task force are at risk, I am prepared to possibly mislead you by committing the lesser sin of omission."[62]

A press officer attached to the task force was reported to say to the newsmen: "You must have been told you could not

THE PLAYERS

THE GOVERNMENT

Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Francis Pym, Foreign Secretary
John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence
Sir Frank Cooper, Permanent Under Secretary of the Ministry of Defence
Ian McDonald, Official Spokesman of the Ministry of Defence
Adm. John Woodward, Commander of the Task Force
John Page, Member of Parliament, Conservative

THE PRESS

In London:
George Howard, BBC Chairman
Sir Ian Frethowan, BBC Director General
Alan Protheroe, BBC Assistant Director General
Fred Emery, The **Times**
Simon Jenkins, The **Times**

With the Task Force:
Brian Hanrahan, BBC TV News
Max Hastings, The **Daily Express**, the London **Standard**, the **Spectator** magazine
A.J. McIlroy, The **Daily Telegraph**
Michael Nicholson, ITN—Independent Television News
Gareth Parry, The **Guardian**
Mick Seamark, The **Star**
John Shirley, The Sunday **Times**
Tony Snow, The **Sun**
John Witherow, The **Times**

Glossary:
BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation
ITN, Independent Television News (the British private television station)

report bad news before you left: you knew when you came you were expected to do a 1940 propaganda job."[63]

The best statement, however, was issued by an anonymous Ministry of Defence official. Pressed to say what lesson the Ministry had learnt from its handling of the news, the official thought hard, then said: "Next time, we'll cut down on the number of journalists."[64]

CONCLUSION

"It is now clear that, in the wars of our time, Vietnam was an aberration. The freedom given to the correspondents there to go anywhere, see everything, and write what they liked is not going to be given again....the Falklands war has provided a model of how to make certain that government policy is not undermined by the way a war is reported."[65]

The Falklands-Malvinas conflict is indeed a classic example of how a government can manage the news in wartime. The rules of the game are simple and effective. A decalogue can be sketched:

- 1) Control access to the fighting.
- 2) Control all communications facilities.
- 3) Exclude neutral correspondents.
- 4) Carefully screen your own.
- 5) Ban or delay all pictorial coverage. It has too much impact. In particular, ban live TV.
- 6) Check all the material (stories, tapes) the reporters have gathered.
- 7) Censor, delay or suppress dangerous news.
- 8) Release bad news in dribs and drabs, so as to reduce its impact.
- 9) Play favoritism. Reward patriotic reporters.
- 10) Blame "technical reasons." It is an excellent excuse in a lot of circumstances.

The success of the British government in handling the information was remarkable. It succeeded in giving the impression that the press was allowed to do its job, and at the same time it controlled effectively the flow of information. The journalists were allowed to accompany the task force and to file regularly to their news organizations. At the same time, they were wrapped in a net of subtle restrictions, that let them free only in the measure desired by the Ministry of Defence.

Some of the means that the Ministry used were particularly clever. Cooper had the sagacity to substitute the usual Ministry spokesmen — who were in friendly relations with the journalists — with another set of information officials. The usual spokesmen were of course denied access to the news. In this way the only source of information became the official daily briefing. No leaks from the Ministry of Defence seem to have occurred during the conflict.

The Ministry handled the briefings effectively. By ably playing ambiguities, rumors, half truths and delayed announcements, it often succeeded in using the media for its own goals.

A clever move was also to cut off the journalists accompanying the task force from their news organizations. After the British landed, the newsmen followed the troops on the mainland. The messages transmitted to them by their news organizations reached the ship, Canberra, but nobody bothered to further the messages to the newsmen in the field. In this way, the journalists were cut off from their editors, deprived of directions — a factor that certainly had psychological and practical consequences.

Britain being a democracy, the government and the military could not always have their way. Both had to face external checks and balances. The Navy had to give up its original plan — no journalists with the task force — because of the insistence of the media. The BBC seemed to resist the pressures of the Prime Minister, of the Foreign Secretary and of the Defence Secretary (we don't know if something happened behind the scenes).

But many sensitive stories were made public only when the war was over. Dramatic television footage, that could shock the servicemen's relatives and the public at large, was put on the air only after the Argentinian surrender. Newmen had to wait to be back home to see some of their stories published—the newspapers' pages were then full of accounts of the "untold story of the war."

The Falklands-Malvinas war and other recent events (Lebanon, Grenada) show that governments have learned the lesson of Vietnam, as far as reporting wars is concerned. Vietnam

has perhaps been a turning point in the relations between press and government in wartime. Governments are likely to exert in the future various forms of control of the press. In this sense, the Falklands-Malvinas war has been a useful and largely successful test.

FOOTNOTES

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3. Ibid., p. 51.
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6. Ibid., p. 6.
7. **The New York Times**, July 29, 1982, p. Y3.
8. **The Times**, May 11, 1982, p. 6.
9. **IPI Report**, op. cit., p. 11.
10. Alan Protheroe, "Covering the Event in a Parliamentary Democracy. The British Media in the Falklands Crisis," **EBU Rewview**, 33, November 1982, pp. 14-16.
11. Eddy, Linklater and Gillman, p. 210.
12. Ibid., pp. 210-211.
13. **The Times**, May 4, 1982, p. 2.
14. **The Times**, May 7, 1982, p. 5.
15. Ibid.
16. Jenny Adler and Tony Clifton, "In War, Truth or Faction?", **Newsweek**, May 24, 1982, p. 86.
17. **The Times**, May 7, 1982, p. 5.
18. **The Times**, May 8, 1982, p. 3.
19. Simon Jenkins, "When Soldiers Play Journalist and Journalist Play at Soldiers," **The times**, May 10, 1982, p. 8.
20. **The Times**, May 11, 1982, p. 6.
21. Ibid.
22. **The Times**, May 12, 1982, p. 1.
23. **The Times**, May 14, 1982, p. 7.
24. **The Times**, May 17, 1982, p. 4. The coverage issue was widely debated on the pages of **The Times**: cfr. the editorial "A Duty to Inform" (May 13, 1982, p. 13) and Fred Emery's article (June 10, 1982, p. 6). Besides many articles, **The Times** published numerous letters of readers, equally divided in criticizing and defending the performance of the media.

    The British press dedicated wide space to this issue. Alan Protheroe, BBC assistant director, wrote in **The Listener** that "there are no private wars anymore. The Falklands crisis has show us how not to fight and information war. The Ministry of Defence's performance in this area has been close to disastrous." ("Why We Have Lost the Information War," **The Listener**, June 3, 1982, pp. 2-3.)

    On the contrary, Margaret Thatcher was satisfied with the Ministry's performance. In a written reply at the Commons, she said she was satisfied that information had been handled properly by the departments concerned. (**The Times**, June 12, 1982, p. 5).
25. **The Times**, May 10, 1982, p. 8.
26. **The New York Times**, July 29, 1982, p. Y3.
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28. **The Times**, July 3, 1982, p. 22.
29. Eddy, Linklater and Gillman, p. 213.
30. **The Times**, June 10, 1982, p. 6.
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32. **The Times**, July 3, 1982, p. 22.
33. Eddy, Linkater and Gillman, p. 213.
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36. **The Kansas City Star**, June 18, 1982, p. 5A.
37. **The Times**, June 10, 1982, p. 6.
38. Eddy, Linklater and Gillman, p. 214.
39. Bishop, p. 8.
40. **IPI Report**, p. 14; Adler and Clifton, p. 86.
41. Eddy, Linklater and Gillman, p. 214.
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54. **The Kansas City Star**, June 18, 1982, p. 5A.
55. **The New York Times**, July 29, 1982, p. Y3.
56. **The Kansas City Star**, June 18, 1982, p. 5A.
57. Downie Jr., p. A15.
58. Johnson, p. 4.
59. Eddy, Linklater and Gillman, p. 210.
60. **The New York Times**, July 29, 1982, p. 5A.
61. Ibid., p. 5A.
62. Johnson, p. 4.
63. **The New York Tims**, July 29, 1982, p. 5A.
64. Eddy, Linklater and Gillman, p. 215. Patrick Bishop, the **Observer's** correspondent with the task force, wrote later that "essentially the journalists were regarded by the Ministry of Defence as public relations men for the Task Force. Their job was to record good news, look for silver lining if things went wrong, praise the qualities of the fighting men and the equipment they used, and steer clear of anything that could be remotely construed as negative. Patriotism mingled with sentimentality were the qualities that they most admired and the members of the press corps who had them were smiled upon." Bishop, op. cit. p. 7.
65. Knightley, p. 53.